THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OHIO’S HOUSE BILL
125: THE HEARTBEAT BILL AS ANALYZED UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Jessica L. Knopp*

I.
II.
III.
IV.

Introduction ........................................................................... 1
Legal Landscape for Abortion in Ohio and Under the
Fourteenth Amendment ......................................................... 4
H.B. 125 Violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment ........................................................................... 6
Conclusion ........................................................................... 15
I. INTRODUCTION

Pro-life legislation was at the forefront of Ohio’s political agenda
for 2011. With newly elected Republican governor John Kasich, 1 a
Republican-dominated Ohio House of Representatives, 2 and a
Republican-dominated Ohio Senate, 3 several pro-life bills have been
considered, debated, and ultimately enacted into law by the Ohio
Legislature. These laws have progressively chipped away at a woman’s
* Jessica L. Knopp received her law degree in 2012 with honors from The University of Akron
School of Law. Ms. Knopp dedicates this Comment to Professor Tracy A. Thomas at The
University of Akron School of Law. Professor Thomas served as the inspiration and support for this
Comment. During her time in law school, Ms. Knopp was privileged to work under and with
Professor Thomas, who shares Ms. Knopp’s passion for advancing women’s legal issues and rights.
Ms. Knopp is currently employed as an attorney in Akron, Ohio. This Comment has been edited
and adapted for online publication with the Akron Journal of Constitutional Law & Policy. The full
version will be available in an upcoming issue of the Akron Law Review.
1. About: John R. Kasich Governor of Ohio, OHIO.GOV (last visited Sept. 16, 2012),
http://governor.ohio.gov/About/GovernorKasich.aspx.
2. Members Displayed by Name, WELCOME TO THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF
THE
129TH
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
(last
visited
Sept.
16,
2012),
http://www.house.state.oh.us/index.php?option=com_displaymembers&Itemid=57.
3. The Ohio Senate, THE 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OHIO SENATE MEMBERS (Sept. 16,
2012) http://www.ohiosenate.gov/directory.html.
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right to an abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 4
Perhaps the most controversial piece of pro-life legislation
introduced in 2011 was Ohio’s House Bill 125 (“H.B. 125”), 5 commonly
referred to as “The Heartbeat Bill.” 6 If passed into law, H.B. 125 would
require physicians to check the fetus of a pregnant woman for a
“heartbeat.” 7 If the fetus had any detectable cardiac activity, the
physician would be required to inform the woman in writing, and the
woman would be required to sign a form acknowledging the fetal
cardiac activity. 8 Additionally, if the fetus is found to have cardiac
4. For example, H.B. 78/S.B. 72, The Viable Infants Protection Act, prohibits an abortion
after twenty weeks if the physician determines that the fetus is “viable.” S.B. 72, 129th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted).
H.B. 298/S.B. 201 re-prioritizes federal family planning dollars distributed to state health
centers that promote “family planning services.” This bill has the practical effect of
allocating federal funds to organizations like Planned Parenthood last. See H.B.
298/S.B. 201, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted). See also Defund
Planned Parenthood, OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.ohiolife.org/defund-plannedparenthood/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
H.B. 153, signed into law in 2011, bans the performance of abortions in public hospitals
and prohibits abortion coverage in insurance plans for public employees. It also requires
the Ohio Department of Health to apply for federal abstinence education grants. See
Am. Sub. H.B. 123, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_153_EN_N.html.
For final
analysis, see STAFF OF OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM., 129TH GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS.,
FINAL
ANALYSIS
(Comm.
Print
2011),
available
at
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses129/11-hb153-129.pdf.
5. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_125_PH_Y.pdf.
6. See Heartbeat Bill, HEARTBEATBILL.COM, http://www.heartbeatbill.com (last visited
Sept. 22, 2012) (“We invite you to participate in our most powerful lobbying effort yet—we are
going over their heads—directly to God!”); Aaron Marshall, Ohio Senate Republicans Plan to Move
(Nov.
25,
2011,
7:25
PM),
‘Heartbeat’
Bill,
CLEVELAND.COM
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/11/senate_republicans_planning_to.html;
Darrel
Rowland, Ohio Voters Evenly Split on ‘Heartbeat Bill,’ THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2012,
2:08 PM), available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/01/19/quinnipiac-pollheartbeat-bill-fracking.html.
7. H.B. 125 (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(B)(2)) (“‘Fetal heartbeat’ means cardiac
activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the gestational
sac . . . (C)(1) Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this division,
no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus the
pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable fetal heartbeat.”).
8. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(D)(2)) (“If the person who intends to perform
an abortion on a pregnant woman detects a fetal heartbeat in the unborn human individual that the
pregnant woman is carrying, no later than twenty-four hours prior to the performance of the
intended abortion, both of the following apply: (a) The person intending to perform the abortion
shall inform the pregnant woman in writing that the unborn human individual that the pregnant
woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat and shall inform the pregnant woman. . .to the best of the
person’s knowledge . . . the statistical probability of bringing the unborn human individual to
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activity, the woman would be banned from having an abortion unless it
was a medical emergency. 9
H.B. 125 does not have a rape exception, which means that a
woman who conceived through violence would be required to proceed to
term as long as the fetus was older than just a few weeks. 10 H.B. 125
also subjects physicians to discipline if they neglect to determine
whether the fetus has detectable cardiac activity. 11 Naturally, the
introduction of such a controversial bill attracted local and national
media attention. 12
Although H.B. 125 poses significant Fourteenth Amendment
problems in light of bedrock Supreme Court precedent such as Roe v.
Wade 13 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 14 this Comment analyzes
how H.B. 125 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.

term . . . (b) The pregnant woman shall sign a form acknowledging that the pregnant woman has
received information from the person intending to perform the abortion that the unborn human
individual that the pregnant woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat . . .”).
9. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(1)) (“Except when a medical emergency
exists that prevents compliance with this division, no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant
woman prior to determining if the fetus of the pregnant woman is carrying a detectable fetal
heartbeat. Any person who performs an abortion on a pregnant woman based on the exception in
this division shall note in the pregnant woman’s medical records that a medical emergency
necessitating the abortion existed.”).
9. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(A)(6)) (“Cardiac activity means a biologically
indefinable moment in time, normally when the fetal heartbeat is formed in the gestational sac.”).
10. Id. See also Al Gerhardstein, Opposition Testimony to HB 125, PLANNED PARENTHOOD
ADVOCATES
OF
OHIO
(Mar.
9,
2011),
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Gerhardstein.pdf.
11. H.B. 125 (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(4)) (“If a physician performs an
abortion on a pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus the pregnant woman is carrying has a
detectable fetal heartbeat, the physician is subject to disciplinary action . . . “).
12. See Catherine Candisky, Ohio House Approves Anti-Abortion Bills, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 28, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/28/ohio-houseapproves-heartbeat-bill.html; Stephanie Condon, Abortion battles spring up nationwide as states
test the limits of Roe v. Wade, CBSNEWS (Mar. 21, 2011, 5:00 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20044823-503544.html; Erik Eckholm, Anti-Abortion
TIMES
(Dec.
4,
2011),
Groups
Are
Split
on
Legal
Tactics,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/health/policy/fetal-heartbeat-bill-splits-anti-abortionforces.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www; Ann Sander, Abortion Foes Push Fetal
Heartbeat
Bills
in
States,
MSNBC
(Oct.
12,
2011,
3:31:17
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44879242/ns/politics-more_politics/t/abortion-foes-push-fetalheartbeat-bills-states/UFaPc45wa20.
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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II. LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR ABORTION IN OHIO AND UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Abortion in Ohio is defined as “the purposeful termination of a
human pregnancy by any person, including the pregnant woman herself,
with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead
fetus or embryo.” 15 Absent certain exceptions, after a fetus is viable,
abortion procedures are prohibited. 16 And generally after twenty weeks,
abortions are prohibited. 17
In an effort to ensure a woman’s choice to have an abortion is
informed, Ohio also mandates a specified waiting period for women
seeking to have an abortion and requires dissemination of certain
information prior to having the procedure. These laws are frequently
dubbed “informed consent provisions.” 18 Ohio, and particularly the City
of Akron, has been the catalyst for many of the nation’s informed
consent provisions.
In 1983, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 19
examined the constitutionality of ordinances designed to prevent a
woman from obtaining an abortion absent the recognition of certain
information. 20 The ordinances mandated that an abortion could only be
performed in a hospital setting; required a pregnant woman to wait
twenty-four hours prior to having an abortion to deliberate over the
decision; required the physician to inform the woman about the
development of the fetus, the status of her pregnancy, and physical and
emotional complications that may result from pregnancy; and required
the physician to give the woman a list of agencies that could assist with
adoption and childbirth. 21 The City of Akron presented two arguments:
(1) providing a woman with this information was part of the “informed
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.11 (West 2012).
16. Id. § 2919.17(A).
17. Id.§ 2919.18(A)(1).
18. Christine L. Raffaele, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by Which Providers
of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119
A.L.R.5th 315 (2004).
19. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
20. Id. at 421-23.
21. Id. Just four years previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio found these Akron ordinances unconstitutional in Akron Center for Reproductive Health v.
City of Akron, 479 F.Supp 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The district court held unconstitutional the
“truly informed consent” provisions of the ordinance, which required the physician to give the
pregnant woman a detailed description of the “anatomical and physiological characteristics of the
particular unborn child . . . .” Id. at 1203. The court reasoned that this provision violated the
woman’s right to privacy and went “far beyond what is permissible in pursuance of [the State’s]
interest.” Id.
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consent” process because it made her decision to have an abortion more
informed, and (2) these ordinances protected the life of the woman. 22
Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Akron’s ordinances
as unconstitutional, 23 the Court reconsidered similar ordinances in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, finding some informed consent
provisions constitutional. 24 In Casey, a twenty-four hour waiting
period 25 and a statute that required the pregnant woman to receive
certain information, including information about adoption and childbirth,
were upheld as constitutional. 26 Since Casey, Ohio has enacted many
informed consent provisions designed to “ensure that the woman’s
choice is informed” and “designed to . . . persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion.” 27 After the Court’s decision in Casey, Ohio
immediately enacted a law requiring the same twenty-four hour waiting
period originally at issue in Akron Reproductive Health.
In addition to the twenty-four hour waiting period, Ohio has
introduced other measures to ensure a woman’s choice is “informed” or
“persuaded.” 28 Ohio mandates that a pregnant woman receive certain
information designed to affect her abortion decision. For example, the
woman must receive materials that include information designed to
discourage her from having an abortion and to encourage her to pursue
“family planning.” 29 Furthermore, since Akron Reproductive Health and
Casey, States have found new methods to ensure informed consent prior
to an abortion, such as requiring an ultrasound procedure. 30 Ultrasounds
are commonly used during pregnancy to examine the health of the fetus

22.
23.
24.

Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 421-23.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). See also TRACY
A. THOMAS, JUSTICE & LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OHIO 179-184 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Alexander, eds.,
2012).
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
26. Id. at 881.
27. Id. at 878. See also Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent:
Lessons to Be Learned from the Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical
Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 359-60 (2011) (arguing that informed consent
provisions constitute informational manipulation).
28. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(C) (West 2012). The information that the State is
required to give “describe[s] the embryo or fetus” and “list[s] agencies that offer alternatives to
abortion.” Id. Additionally, this information must be provided in-person and must take place
before the twenty-four hour waiting period begins. Id.
30. See Carol Sanger, Seeing is Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) (arguing that the use of ultrasounds has become a
mechanism in the law to deter women from having abortions).
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and to provide a physical image of it. 31 Ohio enacted its ultrasound
statute in 2008. 32 Now H.B. 125 seeks to push the informed consent
provisions even further.
Under current Supreme Court precedent, Ohio’s H.B. 125
implicates serious Fourteenth Amendment issues. Roe v. Wade held that
a woman had the right to have an abortion during the first trimester of
her pregnancy and that this right derived from her privacy right
embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 The Supreme Court then
used Casey to transform the Roe v. Wade trimester analysis into a fetal
viability analysis, implementing an “undue burden” standard. Under
Casey, an abortion statute is unconstitutional if it seeks to place an
undue burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. 34 An undue
burden is “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 35
Because H.B. 125 seeks to regulate abortion according to cardiac
activity, which can occur as early as five to six weeks after conception,36
it would be regulating abortion prior to fetal viability. 37 H.B. 125,
therefore, is subject to the undue burden analysis under Casey. 38
According to the undue burden test, since H.B. 125 places a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to viability, it
would be unconstitutional. 39 But in addition to its clear Fourteenth
Amendment concerns, H.B. 125 also implicates problems under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 40
III. H.B. 125 VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
31. Definition of Pregnancy Ultrasound, MEDICINENET (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9509.
32. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.561 (West 2012).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-163. The Court also listed previous cases that guaranteed
certain areas or zones of privacy from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 152-53.
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
35. Id. at 877-78.
36. See Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASSOC. (Sept.
2008),
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelopment.htm.
Five and a half to six and a half weeks after conception is usually a very good time to detect either a
fetal pole or even a fetal heartbeat by vaginal ultrasound. Id.
37. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_125_PH_Y.pdf.
38. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
39. See id.
40. See Martha A. Field, Abortion and the First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 545, 551
(1996) (acknowledging that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment can provide a
foundation for access to abortion).
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AMENDMENT
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress
and the States from, inter alia, passing laws that establish a national
religion or prefer one religion to another. 41 The focus of the
Establishment Clause is neutrality, 42 and some members of the Supreme
Court have asserted that this neutrality should take the form of a “wall of
separation between church and State.” 43
Opponents to H.B. 125 believe that the bill would impute religious
principles on Ohioans by valuing the potential life of a fetus above the
life of the mother 44 and by determining when a fetus becomes a
person. 45 The determination of when a fetus becomes a person
implicates religious values both for people that believe life begins after
cardiac activity and for people that believe life begins at the moment of
conception. While other First Amendment concerns arise in the abortion
context, 46 this Comment focuses on Supreme Court precedent addressing
41. U.S. CONT. amend. I. See Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1104-10, 1119-26 (1979), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol67/iss5/2 (arguing that the First
Amendment should be construed to prohibit government establishment of particular political
ideology).
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
43. March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. See Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio
House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Rabbi Emily Rosenzweig,
Ohio
Religious
Coalition
for
Reproductive
Choice),
available
at
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Rosenzweig.pdf; Opposition Testimony to
the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio House of Representatives,
112th Cong, 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Allan Debelak, Pastor of Reedemer Lutheran Church in
Columbus), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Debelak.pdf.
45. See Testimony–Ohio: to H.B. 125: Senate Health, Human Services, and Aging Committee
in Opposition to H.B. 125, 112th Cong, 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Pastor David Meredith, Broad
St.
United
Methodist
Church),
available
at
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Meredith_121311.pdf.
46. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 830-31
(1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (briefly
addressing whether compelled speech on behalf of physicians violated the First Amendment); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174 (1991) (holding that regulations prohibiting abortion as a method of
family planning in counseling do not violate First Amendment free speech rights by impermissibly
imposing viewpoint-discriminatory conditions by Government subsidies); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abortion
and Birth Control § 79 (2012).
Another unreported effect of anti-abortion legislation is the effect it has on doctors
willing to enter into the profession. Lydia Strauss, the Supervisor of Support Services
for Capital Care Women’s Center in Ohio, in a live interview explained that the lack of
physicians willing to perform abortions will be an epidemic soon. Interview with Lydia
Strauss, Supervisor of Support Services for Capital Care Women’s Center in Ohio (Dec.
6, 2011). Regardless of whether proposed pro-life legislation actually passes, it
contributes to the overall body of media hype regarding abortions and deters physicians
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the establishment of religion by the state through its abortion laws and
how that precedent affects H.B 125.
In a series of cases addressing funding for abortion through state
and federal medical plans, the Supreme Court routinely dismissed
alleged Establishment Clause violations. In Maher v. Roe, 47 the
Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation under which
Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services related to
childbirth but not for therapeutic abortions. 48 The Supreme Court
reasoned that unequal subsidization was permissible under Roe v. Wade
because the regulations did not place any obstacles in a pregnant
woman’s path to an abortion. 49 While the regulations may have
effectuated Connecticut’s views on abortion, the regulations themselves
did not impose a restriction on access to abortion. 50
In Poelker v. Doe, 51 the Supreme Court found no constitutional
violation when the City of St. Louis decided as matter of policy to only
provide hospital services for childbirth and not for abortions in the
public hospital setting. 52 More recently in Harris v. McRae, 53 the Court
considered whether an amendment to the Social Security Act violated
the First Amendment. 54 The amendment prohibited the use of federal
funds to reimburse people for abortions sought under Medicaid, absent
some exceptions. 55 Plaintiffs challenging the amendment argued that it
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it
incorporated views of the Roman Catholic Church about the sinfulness
of abortion and the time at which life begins. 56 The plaintiffs also
argued that the amendment violated the Free Exercise Clause by
preventing a woman from having an abortion as an exercise of her
religious beliefs under Protestant or Jewish faiths. 57
from entering the profession because of its controversy. Id. Ms. Straus stated that all of
the abortion-providing physicians she works with in Ohio are older and seeking to retire
soon, but there are no newer physicians that are willing to enter the practice. Id. Based
upon Ms. Straus’s experience in the field, she believes that even if abortion remains legal
in Ohio prior to viability, the lack of physicians willing to perform the procedure will be
an epidemic soon. Id.
47. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Id.
51. Poekler v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
52. Id. at 521.
53. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
54. Id. at 302-311.
55. Id. at 302.
56. Id. at 318-319.
57. Id. at 311-19.
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Without conducting a lengthy analysis, the Supreme Court
dismissed the First Amendment claims in Harris, reasoning that a statute
does not violate the First Amendment simply because “it happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.” 58 To
illustrate its point, the Court reasoned “that [although] the JudeoChristian religions oppose stealing [that] does not mean that a State . . .
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws
prohibiting larceny.” 59 The Court then categorized the amendment as a
“reflection of traditionalist values towards abortion” 60 which, without
more, did not violate the Establishment Clause.61
Maher, Poelker, and Harris demonstrate how the Supreme Court
has rejected Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause arguments
against antiabortion laws despite the role of religion in the abortion
debate. 62 However, H.B. 125’s religious concerns are distinguishable
from the laws at issue in Maher, Poelker, and Harris because H.B. 125
directly places an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
The Court in Maher, for example, upheld a restriction on funding for
abortion, reasoning that, although funding allocation affected abortion,
the funding itself did not place an obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. 63 H.B. 125, however, not only places an obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion, but it also seeks to make the
decision for the woman. 64
Establishment of religion concerns were also briefly touched upon
in Roe v. Wade and Casey. Roe v. Wade recognized that abortion must
be a constitutional issue:
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life
and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes

58. Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). See also Crossen
v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 840 (6th Cir. 1971) (declining to address the argument that an
abortion law “violates the establishment clause . . . in that it enacts as law the religious beliefs of
certain groups not held by other persons.”).
59. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 319-20.
62. See John Morton Cummings Jr., The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment
Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1217-1218 (1990); David R.
Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479, 479
(1990).
63. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977).
64. But see Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that laws informed by
religious moral premises generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the First Amendment).
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and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s
thinking and conclusions about abortion . . . . Our task, of course, is to
resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
65
predilection.

Additionally, Casey recognized that people will always disagree about
the “profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy” and recognized that “[s]ome of us as individuals find
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that
cannot control our decision.” 66 The Court went on to state again that
abortion is a constitutional, not a religious, issue. 67 The Court also
recognized that the only religious aspect that should be involved in the
abortion decision is the woman’s own spirituality. 68
Opponents to H.B. 125 believe the bill violates the First
Amendment because it effectively values the life of the fetus as coequal
with or above the life of the mother, a valuation inconsistent with the
religious beliefs of many people. 69 Jewish Rabbi Emily Rosenzweig, for
example, has argued that H.B. 125 directly opposes the Jewish faith by
valuing the potentiality of the fetus above the health and welfare of an
In the Jewish faith, Exodus 21:22-23
already-living woman. 70
distinguishes the legal status of the fetus as less than that of the pregnant
woman by assigning a financial penalty for the death of the fetus but a
capital penalty for the death of the woman. 71 According to Jewish
Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 58a, rabbis are taught that the fetus is the
thigh of its mother. The pregnant woman is the person, and the fetus is
part of her body. 72 Because H.B. 125 seeks to prevent a woman from
having an abortion after the detection of cardiac activity absent only a
medical emergency, it therefore equates the value of the woman’s life

65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
66. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
67. Id. (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”).
68. Id. at 852 (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”).
69. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Religious Coalition for Reprod. Choice et al. in
Support of Respondent at 10, 21, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (arguing
that Nebraska’s statute banning partial-birth abortion “has unconstitutionally imbedded into law
certain religious beliefs over others” though framing the legal issue as one of “individual
conscience”).
70. Rosenzweig, supra note 44.
71. Id. (citing Exodus 21:22-23 (”If people are fighting and hit a pregnant woman and she
gives birth prematurely but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the
woman’s husband demands and the court allows. But if there is serious injury, you are to take life
for life . . . .”)).
72. Rosenzweig, supra note 44.
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with the fetus, directly contradicting Jewish beliefs.
Some followers of Christian-based faiths also believe H.B. 125
encroaches on their religious beliefs and therefore violates the Establish
Clause. For example, Methodist Pastor David Meredith provided
opposition testimony on behalf of Methodists and does not support H.B.
125. 73 The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church requires
Methodists to respect the life of the mother who may be severely
damaged from an unacceptable pregnancy. 74 Some members of the
United Church of Christ are similarly opposed to H.B. 125 because it
contradicts The Sixteenth General Synod of the United Church of Christ,
which “uphold[s] the right of men and women to have access to
adequately funded family planning services, and to safe, legal abortions
as one option among others.” 75 By prohibiting women from accessing
these services, H.B. 125 would establish the parameters by which some
Christians practice their faith in the abortion context.
Pastor Allan Debelak of Redeemer Lutheran Church in Columbus,
Ohio stated that the “sanctity of life” has so many meanings to the
various Christian faiths. To Lutherans the “sanctity of life” means
considering more “than the state of the fetus.” 76 Reverend Robert
Molsbury, the Conference Minister for the Ohio Conference of the
United Church of Christ, perhaps sums up many of these Christian
opponents’ views best by stating, “House Bill 125 reflects an extreme
expression of Christianity that even I, a faithful, practicing Christian,
would find oppressive if it were to be enacted into law.” 77
The specific language used in H.B. 125 suggesting that the life of a
fetus begins at a certain point in time also raises Establishment Clause
concerns. Because America is home to many religions, religious
diversity precludes a unanimous sectarian view of when life actually
begins. 78 Reflecting on the Texas abortion laws that established life as
73. Meredith, supra note 45.
74. Id.
75. Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B. 125 before the
Ohio Senate, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Reverend Robert Molsberry, Conference
Minister for the Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ), available at
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Molsberry121311.pdf.
76. Debelak, supra note 44.
77. Molsberry, supra note 75.
78. Brief Amicus Curiae for American Jewish Congress at 11-17, Webster v. Reprod. Health
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No.88-605). Views regarding abortion defy unanimity, even
within sects. Id. While many Roman Catholics reject abortion, some allow it under certain
circumstances. Id. Baptists generally consider their opposition to abortion as non-binding. Id. The
Episcopal Church continues to support a woman’s right to have an abortion, as do the Presbyterians,
who focus on viability. Id. Many Protestant theologians maintain that life does not begin at
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beginning at conception, Justice Harry Blackmun famously stated that
the Court is not in a position to speculate on “the difficult question of
when life begins” because not even those trained in medicine,
philosophy, and theology are able to arrive at a consensus. 79 For this
reason, the Court in Roe v. Wade and in Casey drew the line of
constitutionality at fetal viability—because the precise determination as
to when life begins is impossible to make in light of Americans’ varying
religious views. Furthermore, the fetal viability line is a practical and
legal line, not a religious line, and it allows States to prohibit abortions
after viability because that is when the State’s interest in preserving life
becomes compelling. 80 The Court in Roe v. Wade reasoned that viability
is the appropriate demarcation because “the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” 81
Although H.B. 125 does not attempt to redefine viability as the
moment of detectable cardiac activity, 82 it seeks to proscribe abortion at
a point in time much earlier than viability as defined in Roe v. Wade.
Some Christians take issue with this determination. For example, Pastor
Meredith believes that abortion is consistent with Christian principles in
certain situations and that H.B. 125 seeks to unconstitutionally espouse
certain Christian religious principles on others by making a blanket
This
determination for all persons as to when life begins. 83
determination also affects persons on the opposite side of the spectrum,
including religious pro-life groups, who believe that life begins prior to
detectable cardiac activity and prior to viability.
Ohio Right to Life (“ORTL”), Ohio’s largest and long-serving prolife non-profit, is a religious group that believes a fetus is a person from
the moment of conception and not from the point at which cardiac
activity is detectable. 84 ORTL routinely works with elected officials to
draft and pass laws advocating for the fetus’s right to life, arguing that
“[t]he right to life is the most fundamental of all our liberties as
Americans and as God’s creation.” 85 ORTL does not support H.B. 125
conception, as do many Jewish groups. Id.
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
80. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); Cummings Jr.,
supra note 62, at 1234-1237.
81. 410 U.S. at 163.
82. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacting OHIO REV.
CODE § 2919.19(A)(5)).
83. Meredith, supra note 45.
84. Ohio Right to Life Mission, OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.ohiolife.org/mission-andbeliefs (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
85. Ohio Right to Life Mission: “Who We Are Video,” OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE,
http://www.ohiolife.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (“The right to life is the most
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in its current form because it is not a conception-based bill. If H.B. 125
were a consent-only bill, thus requiring the woman to only be informed
about the presence of a fetal heartbeat, then the organization would
support the bill because it is requiring the woman to make a decision
regarding an abortion based upon all the available information.86
However, ORTL’s position for nearly forty years has been that life
begins at the moment of conception, not weeks later when the heartbeat
begins. 87 H.B. 125 therefore “represents a potential step backwards in
the truth of the matter,” 88 and determining that a fetus is a person at the
point of cardiac activity, rather than conception, encroaches upon
ORTL’s religious beliefs. 89 Therefore, H.B. 125 implicates religious
concerns for people on both sides of the spectrum—those that believe
life begins earlier than cardiac activity and those that believe life begins
later than cardiac activity—by defining a precise point in time at which a
woman cannot have an abortion.
The language in H.B. 125 referring to cardiac activity beginning at
a biologically identifiable point in time also poses an Establishment
Clause issue. The Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services 90 addressed similar language to that used in H.B. 125. In
Webster, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a series
of Missouri state laws that sought to regulate abortion. The preamble to
Missouri’s law contained “findings” by the state legislature that “[t]he
fundamental of all our liberties as Americans and as God’s creation,” quote from Stephanie Krider,
Ohio Right to Life Director of Legislative Affairs.).
86. Letter from Marshal M. Pitchford, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees & Political Action Comm.
for Ohio Right to Life Society, to The Hon. Lynn Wachtmann, Chairman of the Health & Aging
Comm., Ohio House of Representatives, at 3 (May 6, 2011), available at
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_ORTL120711.pdf.
87. Letter from Marshal M. Pitchford, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees & Political Action Comm.
for Ohio Right to Life Society, to Ohio Life Chapter Leaders, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.ohiolife.org/storage/Affiliated%20Chapter%20Letter.pdf.
88. Id.
89. ORTL has voiced other concerns regarding H.B. 125. Id. at 1-3. ORTL understands the
current Supreme Court case law does not support the bill and believes that a specific legal protocol
must be followed in order to overturn Roe v. Wade and Casey. Id. The organization believes that if
their pro-life legislation is not well timed it will be held unconstitutional because ORTL recognizes
that members of the Supreme Court greatly affect the legislation’s success. Id. ORTL believes
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan will not support the constitutionality of H.B. 125. Id. ORTL
believes that if the Supreme Court is ready to hold constitutional a heartbeat bill, it is ready to hold
constitutional a conception-based bill. Id. Additionally, ORTL fears more binding precedent
reaffirming Roe v. Wade that ORTL and other pro-life supporters will have to overcome in the
future. Id. Lastly, ORTL believes that defending H.B. 125 will exhaust much needed treasury
money and will award thousands of Ohio taxpayer dollars to pro-choice organizations’ attorneys,
thus ultimately supporting abortion. Id.
90. Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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life of each human being begins at conception” and that “unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.” 91 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that Missouri’s
declaration that life begins at conception was “simply an impermissible
state adoption of theory of when life begins to justify its abortion
regulations” and was therefore unconstitutional. 92 However, the
Supreme Court determined that this was not law because the language
was in the statute’s preamble and merely expressed a “value
judgment.” 93 Because the preamble language was a value judgment and
because of federalism concerns, the Court concluded it was not
empowered to decide “abstract propositions . . . for the government of
future cases.” 94
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that
absent a secular legislative declaration, the preamble violated the
Establishment Clause. 95 The preamble, Justice Stevens continued, was
an “unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no
means all Christian faiths,” “serve[d] no identifiable secular purpose,”
and espoused Roman Catholic beliefs. 96
H.B. 125’s first section contains similar language to the preamble
language of the Missouri statutes in Webster. The first section of H.B.
125 concludes that “[c]ardiac activity begins at a biologically
identifiable moment in time, normally when the fetal heart is formed in
the gestational sac” 97 and later prohibits abortions after the detection of
this cardiac activity. 98 Like the Missouri statutes, H.B. 125 makes a
precise determination of exactly when life begins for all persons by
prohibiting abortion after the determination of cardiac activity. The
Supreme Court precedent in Webster suggests that this language may be
91. Id. at 501.
92. Id. at 503.
93. Id. at 506.
94. Id. at 506-07 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409
(1900)).
95. Id. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 566-569 (“As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-monthgestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. There can be no interest in protecting the newly
fertilized egg from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not
yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that interest is valid. In fact, if one prescinds the
theological concept of ensoulment . . . a State has no greater secular interest in protecting the
potential life of an embryo that is still “seed” than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an
unfertilized ovum.”).
97. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacting OHIO REV.
CODE § 2919.19(A)(6)).
98. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(1)).
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a value judgment. However, H.B. 125’s language is not labeled as a
“preamble” but instead is a part of the statute itself. In H.B. 125, the
heading declares that the language underneath the section is based on
“contemporary medical research,” perhaps attempting to provide a
“secular purpose” to combat Justice Stevens’ dissenting concerns in
Webster. With the new makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
may be willing to view H.B. 125’s language as more than a mere value
judgment and may instead view it as an Establishment Clause violation.
Pre-viability prohibition of abortion is the product of religious
belief in life beginning at the point of cardiac activity, comingling
religious principles with legal rights in a manner intolerable under the
First Amendment. Casey specifically demarcated viability as the point
of prohibition because it is a fair and independent factor separate from
diverging religious principles. 99 H.B. 125 seeks to depart from this
constitutionally-drawn line, therefore constituting an establishment of
state-sponsored religion in violation of the First Amendment. 100
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Ohio has consistently been at the forefront in antiabortion legislation, H.B. 125 goes one step too far. This bill violates
Ohioans’ First Amendment right to be free from state-sponsored religion
by valuing the potential life of the fetus over the mother’s life and by
making a blanket determination for all Ohioans regarding when life
begins and when it is worth protecting. In the midst of Ohio’s efforts to
further its pro-life agenda, legislators must take a step back and evaluate
the constitutionality of the provisions they seek to impose, reflecting not
only on Fourteenth Amendment issues but also on how these proposed
laws violate the First Amendment right of Ohioans to be free from statesponsored religion.

99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870-71 (1992) (“Consistent with
other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity
of offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw . . . The viability
line also has . . . an element of fairness . . .”).
100. See Dow, supra note 62, at 499.

